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NOTE
DEFERRED/NON PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS:
EFFECTIVE TOOLS TO COMBAT
CORPORATE CRIME
Michael Yangming Xiao*
As corporations assume a more prominent role in society, govern-
ment authorities face an increasing challenge to combat the concomitant
growth of corporate crime.  While formal criminal and civil litigation
remain important tactics, authorities also rely on alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms, such as cooperation agreements, to remedy cor-
porate delinquency.  Amongst the different types of cooperation agree-
ments, prosecutors increasingly utilize deferred prosecution agreements
(DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs) to bring delinquent cor-
porations to justice.  Commentators, however, have alternately criticized
DPAs and NPAs as both being too harsh and too lenient on corporate
offenders.  This Note analyzes the effectiveness of DPAs and NPAs com-
pared to traditional litigation as well as other alternative dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms such as pretrial settlement.  It will respond to criticisms
and highlight why both DPAs and NPAs should continue to be employed
with increasing frequency by prosecutors to combat corporate
delinquency.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporations play an important role in today’s world.  Often re-
garded as “the centerpiece of a free-market capitalist economy,” their
presence and influence reach almost every corner of society.1  However,
an unfortunate byproduct of the rise of corporation is the criminal mis-
conduct associated with these entities.  Corporate crimes cost the United
States hundreds of billions of dollars annually and inflict great personal,
social, environmental, and economic harm.2
Governmental authorities, especially prosecutors, often struggle in
combating corporate crimes.  Indeed, due to the crimes’ low visibility,3
authorities encounter difficulties at every stage of bringing a delinquent
corporation to justice, from detecting the crime to specifying charges to
collecting evidence for trial.  In the face of these challenges, the govern-
ment often employs alternative methods to levy punishments against cor-
porations, such as cooperation agreements.4  In these agreements, the
defendant pleads guilty to certain charges and agrees to cooperate with
the government.  In exchange the government dismisses other possible
charges or levies a lighter sentence.5
Prosecutors often use two types of cooperation agreements: deferred
prosecution agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements
(NPAs).6  Although DPAs and NPAs were initially created as alternative
forms of punishment for juvenile and drug offenders, they are being used
increasingly in corporate crime proceedings.7  In 2007, the number of
federal corporate DPAs and NPAs increased seventy percent from the
1 David O. Friedrichs, Trusted Criminals: White Collar Crime in Contemporary Society
67 (1995).
2 Victor E. Kappeler & Gary W. Potter, Corporate Crime and “Higher Immorality,” in
The Mythology of Crime and Criminal Justice 149 (Victor E. Kappeler and Gary W. Potter
eds., 2005).
3 Friedrichs, supra note 1, at 132. R
4 See Julie R. O’Sullivan, Federal White Collar Crime: Cases and Materials 1124
(2012).
5 See id.
6 The difference between DPAs and NPAs is whether charges were ever filed. See
O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1155.  For the purpose of this Note, the distinction between the
two cooperation agreements will not be elaborated.
7 See Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?  Judicial
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1863, 1863-64
(2005); see also Corporate Deferred, Non-Prosecution Agreements Up 70 Percent in 2007, 21
Corp. Crime Rep. 2 (Jan.8, 2008), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferred010708
.htm.
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previous year.8  DPAs and NPAs have been identified as “the standard
method of settling major federal corporate crime investigations.”9  Be-
tween 2000 and 2010, the number of DPAs and NPAs issued by the
Department of Justice for corporate crimes rose by 3200%.  In 2009
alone, DPAs and NPAs incorporated over 1.45 billion U.S. dollars in
fines and penalties.10  Today, DPAs and NPAs remain a popular tactic
for prosecutors in resolving corporate criminal cases.  In a single case in
November 2010, the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York (U.S.A.O. E.D.N.Y.) ordered a defendant corporation
to pay twenty million dollars for defrauding the federal government
under the terms of a non-prosecution agreement.11
Commentators have criticized prosecutors’ use of DPAs and NPAs
in corporate crime proceedings as alternately too harsh and too lenient.
On the one hand, many commentators view DPAs and NPAs—and the
justice system in general—as too pro-prosecution.  These mechanisms
lead to over-enforcement, they argue, because prosecutors can exploit
their “virtually unchecked power to extract and coerce ever greater con-
cessions,” which jeopardizes the “very nature of our adversary sys-
tem.”12  Indeed, even current Attorney General Eric Holder stated, while
in private practice, that prosecutors often abuse their authority by re-
questing that defense counsel for corporations waive attorney-client priv-
ileges in exchange for “cooperation” status.13  Forcing such waivers raise
concerns regarding due process.
On the other hand, some commentators warn that DPAs and NPAs
may “allow a corporate criminal to escape without consequences.”14
They believe that alternative mechanisms such as DPAs and NPAs re-
flect the Department of Justice’s “soft-on-corporate-crime” approach,
which excuses business executives and corporations from serious crimi-
8 See Corporate Deferred, Non Prosecution Agreements Up 70 Percent in 2007, 21
Corp. Crime Rep. 2, 2 (Jan.8, 2008), http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferred010708
.htm.
9 See id.
10 See 2010 Year-End Update on Corporate Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution
Agreements, GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP PUBL’N (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.gibsondunn
.com/publications/Documents/2010Year-EndUpdate-CorporateDeferredProsecutionAndNon-
ProsecutionAgreements.pdf.
11 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Schiavone Con-
struction to Pay $20 Million and Costs of Investigation to Resolve Public Works Hiring Fraud
(Nov. 29, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2010/2010nov29.html.
12 Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-
Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1095, 1095
(2006).
13 See Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo and Its Progeny, Wall St. J. Online (Dec. 13,
2006), http://blogs.wsj.com/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo/.
14 Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability: Corporate Criminal Liability in the
United States: Is a New Approach Warranted? 58, Am. J. Comp. L. 605, 622 (2010).
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nal charges in exchange for a fine and a promise to correct their ac-
tions.15  Professor Mary Ramirez stated that these mechanisms create “no
disincentives for committing fraud or white-collar crime, in particular in
the financial space.”16  Many commentators also contrast DPAs and
NPAs in the corporate sphere with the Department of Justice’s zealous
prosecution of low-level street crimes, such as drug offenses.17  They
argue that, while street criminals are often incarcerated for committing
theft, robbery, and other common street crimes—though the actual mon-
etary damage may be relatively miniscule—corporations and corporate
criminals often avoid prison or other meaningful punishment even when
monetary loss is significant.18
This Note seeks to examine some benefits of the DPAs and NPAs
and balance those benefits against their alleged shortcomings.  It will
highlight the challenges government authorities face in punishing corpo-
rate criminals, and describe how DPAs and NPAs mitigate some of these
challenges.  It will also outline the benefits of DPAs and NPAs to corpo-
rations, such as how these mechanisms help maintain the integrity and
financial viability of a punished corporation.  Overall, any perceived
drawbacks of over-enforcement and under-punishment of DPAs and
NPAs against corporations, this Note argues, are outweighed by their
benefits.  DPAs and NPAs should continue to be relied upon in the future
to resolve appropriate types of corporate crimes.  In this Note, “appropri-
ate types” of corporate crimes are defined as crimes which (1) result
primarily in monetary damage and not environmental, physical, or irrep-
arable damage, (2) are categorized as mala prohibita and not mala in se,
(3) can be relatively easily remedied through monetary penalties and af-
firmative remedial plans, and (4) involve guilty actors who can be reha-
bilitated without imprisonment.19
Corporate crimes vary greatly in terms of type of delinquency in-
volved and degree of harm caused.  As such, analyzing a single type of
corporate crime will allow for a simpler and more accurate assessment of
the effects of DPAs and NPAs in combating that specific type of corpo-
rate crime.  DPAs and NPAs resolve a wide range of corporate crimes,
15 See e.g., U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, PRISON LEGAL NEWS,
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/(S(xhaead55yc1favvmoyje5x31))/displayArticle.aspx?article
id=24561&AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2012); Going Soft on Cor-
porate Crime, N.Y. Times (Apr. 10, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/10/opinion/10
thu2.html.
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 Indeed, some corporate crimes which cause serious environmental or physical dam-
age, and are not readily compensable through monetary means, may rightly deserve harsher
punishment such as the imprisonment of guilty actors.  However, these crimes will not be
discussed here.
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but this Note will focus on cases of Disadvantaged Business Enterprises
(DBE) fraud.  DBE fraud is a good representation of “appropriate
crimes” that can be resolved by DPAs and NPAs.  It encompasses many
other types of substantive corporate crimes, including mail fraud and
wire fraud.  As a result, DBE fraud cases demonstrate how DPAs and
NPAs advance public interests by striking the right balance between pun-
ishing corporate wrongdoers and avoiding the negative consequences of
dismantling misbehaving corporations.
I. BACKGROUND OF DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
The Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBE) program was cre-
ated by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) as an af-
firmative action program for businesses owned and operated by
traditionally disadvantaged groups.20  The program’s purpose is to in-
crease both the competitiveness of DBEs and their participation in state
and local procurement.21  DOT defines DBEs to include
for-profit small business concerns where socially and ec-
onomically disadvantaged individuals own at least a
51% interest and also control management and daily
business operations.  African Americans, Hispanics, Na-
tive Americans, Asian-Pacific and Subcontinent Asian
Americans, and women are presumed to be socially and
economically disadvantaged.  Other individuals can also
qualify as socially and economically disadvantaged on a
case-by-case basis.22
Due to their limited size, resources, and capabilities, DBEs are often
not capable of taking on government construction projects as main con-
tractors.  Rather than granting the whole project, state and local transpor-
tation agencies commonly select a non-DBE main contractor for a
project, but require them, as a condition of winning the bid, to allocate
certain portions of the contract to DBE subcontractors.23  The DBE sub-
contractor must perform “commercially useful functions,” which in-
volves “[being] responsible for the execution of a distinct element of the
work of a contract . . . actually performing, managing and supervising the
work involved, and [furnishing] all supervision, labor, tools, equipment,
20 See Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., http://
www.dot.gov/osdbu/disadvantaged-business-enterprise (last visited Sept. 28, 2013).
21 See id.
22 See Definition of a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., http://
osdbuweb.dot.gov/DBEProgram/definitions.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2012).
23 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Two Michigan Construction Firms
Agree to Pay U.S. $11.75 Million for Alleged Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud (Mar.
15, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/March/07_civ_153.html.
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materials and supplies necessary to perform that distinct element of the
work of the contract.”24  In the DPA entered against Ajax Paving Indus-
tries Inc. and Dan’s Excavating Inc., for example, the two corporations—
which were general contractors to a federally funded airport project—
were required to subcontract concrete-supply work to a DBE.25
DBE fraud occurs when enterprises, through misrepresentation or
other forms of deceit, falsely claim to government agencies that they are
fulfilling or have fulfilled DBE requirements in the contract.  Examples
of DBE fraud include when a non-DBE main contractor claims that they
have used DBE subcontractors when they actually performed the work
themselves or used non-DBE subcontractors, or used DBEs as mere
“pass-through” entities without requiring them to actually perform sub-
stantive work.26  DBE fraud also occurs when the DBE firm “should
never have received certification at all, or changes in ownership and
management caused the company to lose its qualification while maintain-
ing certification.”27  In the aforementioned DPAs against Ajax Paving
and Dan’s Excavating, for example, the general contractors were pun-
ished for falsely reporting that they complied with the airport project’s
DBE requirements, when in fact they relegated the DBE subcontractor to
performing “little more than minor administrative tasks.”28
DBE fraud suitably illustrates the effects of DPAs and NPAs for
several reasons.  First, it is a good representation of the type of corporate
crime which is significant primarily in terms of monetary damages, and
rather than a sort of harm that is difficult to compensate (such as environ-
mental or physical damage).  The main resulting harms of DBE fraud are
the deprivation of the federal government of proper allocation of its
funds and the undermining of the federal government’s efforts to assist
traditionally disadvantaged social groups.  There is no serious environ-
mental, physical, or other irreparable harm caused.29
One could reasonably argue that there is little practical difference in
having a part of a construction project done by a DBE subcontractor or a
non-DBE subcontractor, assuming that the quality of the work is similar.
Moreover, if DBEs are relegated to act as pass-through entities, these
enterprises do not appear to suffer any economic loss since the general
24 Indictment at 2, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-1 (E.D.Pa. 2006).
25 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 23. R
26 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
27 Nella M. Bloom, Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Fraud: New Trends, CONSTRUC-
TION LAW SIGNAL (Jan. 20, 2011), http://www.constructionlawsignal.com/by-state/new-york/
disadvantaged-business-enterprise-fraud-new-trends/.
28 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 23. R
29 See, e.g., id. (noting that the defendant was guilty only because he had misrepresented
the involvement of a DBE in the construction project; there were no concerns regarding any
other harm caused).
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contractor still pays them.30  Nonetheless, DBE fraud still warrants atten-
tion because of the misallocation of government funds, denying govern-
ment assistance to traditionally disadvantaged groups—such as women,
veterans, and racial minorities—through participation in government
projects,31 further victimizing these groups and hindering the goal of cre-
ating equitable opportunities for these groups in society.
Second, DBE fraud is a type of malum prohibitum crime (the act is
wrongful because it is prohibited by law) and not malum in se (the act is
bad in itself).32  In fact, DBE fraud is not even a statutorily-defined
crime; rather, DBE fraud occurs when corporations commit other statuto-
rily-defined crimes which defraud government DBE programs.  For in-
stance, in a recently decided case that the DOT referred to as the “largest
reported DBE fraud in the nation’s history,” a jury convicted defendant
Joseph W. Nagle of 26 of the 30 charges he was indicted for.33  The
charges included conspiracy to defraud the DOT, conspiracy to commit
wire and mail fraud, wire and mail fraud, conspiracy to commit money
laundering, and money laundering.34
As a malum prohibitum crime, DBE fraud yields criminals that can
more likely be rehabilitated without imprisonment than criminals who
convict malum in se crimes, such as murder or sexual assault.  Further-
more, by stringing together otherwise distinct corporate crimes under a
common theme, DBE allows for the assessment of the effect of DPAs
and NPAs on various crimes in a unified context.
Third, the direct victims of DBE frauds are government entities,
while indirect victims include DBEs and competitor non-DBE contrac-
tors who unfairly lost their bids on government contracts.  This is unlike
many corporate crimes where the intended victims are from all kinds of
social groups rather than only traditionally disadvantaged ones.  Overall,
the scope of DBE fraud and the unique impact of DBE fraud makes it
particularly worthy of discussion in the context of evaluating DPAs and
NPAs.
30 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Ohio Construction
Firm Agrees to Pay $500,000 to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Apr. 23, 2012), availa-
ble at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/April/12-civ-512.html.
31 See Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE) Program, supra note 20. R
32 Black’s Law Dictionary 588 (9th ed. 2009).
33 See Press Release, Federal Bureau of Investigations Philadelphia Division, Former
President and Owner of Schuylkill Products Convicted in Largest Disadvantaged Business
Enterprise Fraud in Nation’s History (Apr. 6, 2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/philadel
phia/press-releases/2012/former-president-and-owner-of-schuylkill-products-convicted-in-
largest-disadvantaged-business-enterprise-fraud-in-nations-history.
34 See id.
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II. DPAS AND NPAS AND “OVER-ENFORCEMENT”
OF CORPORATE CRIME
In 2003, then-United States Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson issued a memorandum to all United States Attorneys titled
“Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations” (hereinaf-
ter “Thompson Memo”).35  The main focus of the memo is “increased
emphasis on . . . scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation’s coopera-
tion.”36  Among the several factors the Thompson Memo lists for prose-
cutors to consider when deciding whether to charge a corporation are
“the corporation’s timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents.”37
The Thompson Memo is sometimes seen as another move in the
government’s shift of the judicial process away from courts and juries
and into the hands of prosecutors.38  Such a shift gives a corporation
under investigation by United States Attorneys good reason to cooperate
with the prosecutors in order to avoid prosecution.  Since DPAs and
NPAs are forms of cooperation agreements,39 some corporations would
theoretically be more pressured to enter into DPAs and NPAs than they
would be if cooperation were not a factor in the prosecutor’s decision to
prosecute.
Commentators, such as Richard Janis, express concern that prosecu-
tors’ increased bargaining power and the potential of “forced coopera-
tion” undermines the legal system.  He explains:
Prosecutors have exploited their virtually unchecked
power to extract and coerce ever greater concessions,
jeopardizing the very nature of our adversary sys-
tem . . . .  The net result has been the emasculation of the
defense bar and the enforcement of the criminal law in a
way that is often wildly out of proportion to the per-
ceived wrongdoing.  It can be, and often is, a state-spon-
sored shakedown scheme in which corporations are
extorted to pay penalties grossly out of proportion to any
actual misconduct . . . .  [P]ayment of tribute to the fed-
eral government [is] essentially a cost of doing
business.40
35 Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of De-
partment Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www
.albany.edu/acc/courses/acc695spring2008/thompson%20memo.pdf.
36 Id. at preface.
37 Id. at II(4).
38 See Wray & Hur, supra note 12 at 1095, 1186. R
39 See O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1142. R
40 N. Richard Janis, Deputizing Company Counsel as Agents of the Federal Government:
How Our Adversary System of Justice Is Being Destroyed, Washington Law. (Mar. 2005),
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In other words, the worry is that DPAs and NPAs would lead corpo-
rations to plead guilty to crimes that they are not guilty of, or accept
punishments harsher than what is deserved for their misbehavior, out of
fear that not doing so could be seen as non-cooperation and be subject to
potentially worse consequences through trial proceedings.
Another criticism is that, should a case ultimately go to trial, prose-
cutors can use previous DPAs and NPAs as unfair shortcuts to secure a
conviction.41  DPAs and NPAs often require corporations to admit mis-
conduct and implement remedial measures in addition to pay fines and
penalties.  For example, in an NPA for DBE fraud between New York
construction company Schiavone Construction Co. LLC and the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, the com-
pany had to admit that some of its employees engaged in fraudulent con-
duct and promise to undertake various remedial measures to meet the
DBE goals outlined in the construction contracts it signed with the New
York Metropolitan Transit Authority (an agency that receives DOT fund-
ing and thus establishes DBE goals).42  When a defendant corporation
admits guilt, it becomes particularly vulnerable if the case later proceeds
to trial.  This could occur if, for example, prosecutors determine that the
corporation breached the DPAs or NPAs because the corporation failed
to perform a promised remedial measure.  As Christopher A. Wray and
Robert K. Hur observe, “[t]he government . . . [is] armed with the com-
pany’s admission and all the evidence obtained from its cooperation,
making conviction virtually a foregone conclusion.”43
The critics make valid arguments.  However, there are several im-
portant counterpoints.  First, prosecutors generally do not abuse their
power to inflict arbitrary punishment onto otherwise innocent actors.44
Former Assistant U.S. Attorney N. Richard Janis, in the same article crit-
icizing prosecutors for destroying the adversary system, recognized that
“most prosecutors [are] generally fair-minded, conscientious . . . believe
strongly in what they are doing and genuinely believe that they are serv-
ing the public good.”45  He further expressed that “many companies and
individuals who find themselves in the cross[ ]hairs of prosecutors de-
serve the attention they are getting, and prosecution in many such in-
stances are fully warranted.”46  Furthermore, the large monetary
penalties—often millions or even tens of millions of dollars—as well as
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/publications/washington_lawyer/march_2005/
stand.cfm.
41 See Wray & Hur, supra note 12, at 1104-05. R
42 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
43 Wray & Hur, supra note 12, at 1105. R
44 See Janis, supra note 40. R
45 Id.
46 Id.
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painstaking remedial measures stipulated by DPAs and NPAs indicate
that punished corporations will not accept such harsh punishments unless
they are in fact guilty of some misconduct.47
Second, prosecuting corporations via trial is often difficult and time
consuming, and there is no guarantee that the government will secure a
victory against a corporation deserving punishment.  Corporate crimes
are often low visibility and are thus hard to detect.  As such, they are
difficult for prosecutors to gather sufficient evidence for a criminal con-
viction, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt.48  Furthermore,
corporate criminals’ deep pockets means prosecutors are likely to be met
with strong resistance from highly skilled defense counsel, which adds to
the difficulty of securing a conviction through trial.  The “swamped”
court system—due, in part, to recent “get-tough-on-crime” policies as
well as an influx of immigration cases in the federal courts—also means
that it will take a long time for prosecutors to bring a corporate criminal
to justice in a full prosecution.49  In U.S. v. Tulio,50 for example, the
prosecution successfully prosecuted the defendant for DBE fraud.  How-
ever, between the time the alleged fraud occurred (between 1999 and
2001), and the date that the verdict was finalized after a trial and an
appeal (2008), over seven years had elapsed.51  Such lengthy proceedings
hinder the efficient administration of justice, and also costs the govern-
ment significant time, effort, and litigation expenses.  With only a limited
amount of time and resources, prosecutors involved in such a proceeding
may forego charging and prosecuting other corporate crime suspects,
which leads to under-enforcement.
DPAs and NPAs, as well as other cooperation agreements, offer an
attractive solution to these problems.  By closing the case at the pretrial
stage and securing a victory, albeit possibly a smaller one than a trial
verdict, prosecutors avoid the difficulties and uncertainty in trying a cor-
porate criminal.  Indeed, “[g]iven the scanty resources that have been
committed to corporate crime enforcement . . . the government’s leverag-
ing of its prosecution power from corporations and their lawyers has
been critically important.”52  DPAs and NPAs reduce the time, energy,
and cost prosecutors need to spend on a case because it allows them to
bypass many of the procedural requirements involved in a formal judicial
47 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
48 Friedrichs, supra note 1, at 132. R
49 See Anne Gearan, Judges Say US Courts are Swamped, BOSTON.COM (Mar. 17, 2004),
http://articles.boston.com/2004-03-17/news/29204279_1_federal-court-judicial-conference-
federal-judges.
50 263 Fed.Appx.258 (3rd Cir. 2008).
51 See generally id; see also Indictment at 13, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-1 (E.D.Pa.
2006).
52 U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, supra note 15. R
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proceeding, from jury selection and pre-motions to post-trial hearing and
appeals.  This enables the government to make better use of its efforts
and expenses to prosecute more corporate criminals that may otherwise
go unnoticed because of procedural or practical challenges.
Moreover, DPAs and NPAs also increase the efficiency of justice
by fostering cooperative relationships between prosecutors and delin-
quent corporations, and decrease the turnaround time of cases.  In the
NPA between Schiavone and the U.S.A.O of E.D.N.Y, for example, the
alleged DBE fraud occurred from 2002 until 2007.53  Several govern-
ment agencies began investigating Schiavone’s conduct in early 2006.54
Schiavone cooperated with the investigations, and began complying with
government requests as early as September 2008, when they established
an Ethics and Compliance Officer to ensure that the corporation fulfilled
its DBE requirements.55  A full NPA, final and non-appealable, was
reached between Schiavone and the U.S.A.O. E.D.N.Y. in November
2010, approximately four years and nine months after investigations be-
gan.56  This was a much more efficient—and arguably preferable—result
than a full judicial proceeding such as in Tulio, where the prosecutor and
the defendant maintained an adversarial relationship for over seven years
from when investigations started to when the final verdict was af-
firmed.57  Therefore, as long as DPAs and NPAs do not significantly
under-punish corporate criminals, it should continue as a mechanism in
combating corporate crime.
III. DPAS AND NPAS AND “UNDER-PUNISHMENT”
OF CORPORATE CRIME
The new emphasis on DPAs and NPAs in the prosecution of corpo-
rations is documented in “Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations,” a memorandum written in 2008 by then Deputy Attorney
General Mark Filip.58  This memo has since then been incorporated into
53 See Non-Prosecution Agreement Between Schiavone Construction CO. LLC and the
U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y. at 1, available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/
publications/Documents/SchiavoneNPA.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2012).
54 See id.
55 See id at 2-4.
56 See, Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
57 See Indictment at 13, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-1 (E.D.Pa. 2006); see also Judgment,
U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-58 (E.D.Pa. 2006).
58 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney General, to
Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecu-
tion of Business Organizations (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/read
ingroom/dag-memo-08282008.pdf.
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the United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) as Section 9-28.59  Section
9-28.1000, “Collateral Consequences,” states that “[p]rosecutors may
consider the collateral consequences of a corporate criminal conviction
or indictment in determining . . . how to resolve corporate criminal
cases.”60  The section goes on to explain,
[P]rosecutors may take into account the possibly sub-
stantial consequences to a corporation’s employees, in-
vestors, pensioners, and customers, many of whom
may . . . have played no role in the criminal conduct . . . .
[W]here the collateral consequence of a corporation con-
viction for innocent third parties would be significant it
may be appropriate to consider a non-prosecution or de-
ferred prosecution agreement with conditions designed,
among other things, to promote compliance with appli-
cable law and to prevent recidivism.61
Many commentators and members of the public believe that cooper-
ation agreements such as DPAs and NPAs reflect a “soft-on-corporate-
crime” approach which allows corporations to escape “deserved punish-
ment” such as public shaming62  or prison sentences for officers.63
While it is physically impossible place a corporation in prison, corporate
executives and business owners—who otherwise could receive prison
terms—often do avoid spending time in penitentiaries as a result of
DPAs and NPAs.64  Some commentators also note that DPAs and NPAs
allow corporations—perhaps unfairly—to avoid the negative media scru-
tiny common in a formal criminal proceeding.65
Such arguments, however, overlook the reason for the recent popu-
larity of DPAs and NPAs within the realm of corporate crime.  DPAs and
NPAs became especially popular after the demise of Arthur Andersen
59 United States Attorneys’ Manual Section 9-28: Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organization (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_
room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
60 See id. at §9-28.1000.
61 Id.
62 See U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, supra note 15. R
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11 R
(defendant in DBE fraud case resolved through an NPA ordered to pay monetary penalties and
implement remedial measures, but not subject to a prison term); compare U.S. v. Tulio, 263
Fed. Appx. 258 (3rd Cir. 2008) (defendant in DBE fraud case convicted at trial subject to
monetary fines and a fifteen-month prison term).
65 See U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, supra note 15 (contrasting R
how companies such as Enron and WorldCom are widely known to the public because of
formal criminal prosecutions, while AIG slipped under the radar when they paid $126 million
in 2004 as part of a DPA for allowing clients to falsify financial statements).
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LLP following the infamous Enron incident in 2002.66  DPAs and NPAs
avoid the significant negative impact on the economy and otherwise in-
nocent civilians brought on resulting from the so-called “deserving pun-
ishments” of formal criminal proceedings and vast negative media
exposure.  On the one hand, corporations are more eager to enter into
DPAs and NPAs to avoid Arthur Andersen’s fate.67  On the other hand,
the Department of Justice does not want to pay such a high price again to
bring “justice”: the conviction of Arthur Andersen dramatically affected
the accounting industry by reducing the “Big 5” to the “Big 4” and
forced tens of thousands of people out of their jobs.68  Although DPAs
and NPAs may not always avoid negative results,69 the fact that corpora-
tions subject to DPAs and NPAs can continue to exist and operate indi-
cate that such alternative mechanisms alleviate some of the harshness
resulting from formal criminal proceedings such as the case of Arthur
Andersen.
A. A Comparison of DPAs and NPAs to Settlements
Similar to other cooperation agreements, such as pre-trial settle-
ments, DPAs and NPAs provide corporations and the government an op-
portunity to work together and reform the corporation.  This avoids
significant harm to innocent third parties such as employees and custom-
ers.70  In other words, these mechanisms “enable[ ] prosecutors to reform
corporations by purging them of wrongdoers and institute[ing ]compli-
ance mechanisms while sparing companies’ stakeholders from some of
the collateral consequences of a criminal record.”71
DPAs and NPAs are superior mechanisms compared to other coop-
eration agreements in several aspects; these aspects are perhaps why
Mark Filip specifically mentioned them in his memo.72  First, unlike pre-
trial settlements, DPAs and NPAs often require the defendant corpora-
tion to admit a certain degree of guilt in exchange for a lighter punish-
ment, thus better achieving the retributive purposes of legal punishment.
For example, in the NPA for DBE fraud between Schiavone and the
U.S.A.O. E.D.N.Y, the construction corporation was discovered to have
66 See O’Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1155. R
67 See id.
68 Wray & Hur, supra note 12, at 1097 (“Because indictment often amounts to a virtual R
death sentences for business entities . . . corporate prosecutions must be handled with care.”).
69 See Rachel Delaney, Congressional Legislation: The Next Step for Corporate De-
ferred Prosecution Agreements, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 875, 877 (2009).
70 See Christopher J. Christie & Robert M. Hanna, A Push Down the Road of Good
Corporate Citizenship: The Deferred Prosecution Agreement Between the US. Attorney for the
District of New Jersey and Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1043, 1043
(2006).
71 Wray & Hur, supra note 12 at 1105. R
72 Id.
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falsely reported DBE participation percentages to the government.73  In-
stead of making good faith efforts to subcontract specific percentages of
work to qualified DBEs, a condition of winning the bid, Schiavone used
non-DBE entities to complete the work and lied about DBE participa-
tion.74  The NPA required Schiavone—in addition to paying a $20 mil-
lion dollar fine, over $1.5 million in reimbursements for government
investigation, and implementing remedial measures—to acknowledge the
misconduct that led to the NPA.75  Specifically, Schiavone was required
to acknowledge that some of its employees engaged in a scheme to de-
fraud the New York Metropolitan Transit Authority by falsely represent-
ing that some of the work was being performed by DBE subcontractors
as required by the contract, when the work was in fact done by non-DBE
companies.76
In contrast, the DBE fraud pre-trial settlement agreement between
the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Ohio and
Anthony Allega Cement Contractor Inc. (“Allega”), required the accused
to only pay a penalty, but not to admit any wrongdoing.77  The facts of
the Allega case are almost identical the Schiavone situation: Allega was
a prime contractor for a government airport construction project, and, in
winning the bid, was required to allocate a certain percentage of the work
to qualified DBEs.78  Instead of complying, Allega lied to the govern-
ment about DBE participation, and relegated the DBE subcontractor to
the role of pass-through entity.79  A pre-trial settlement agreement, rather
than a DPA or NPA, resolved the charges against Allega.  The press
release regarding the settlement agreement, unlike the NPA for Schia-
vone, explicitly stated that “[t]he claims settled by this agreement are
allegations only, and there has been no determination of liability.”80
Compared to pre-trial settlements DPAs and NPAs better serve the
retributive purpose of criminal punishment.  Retributive theorists often
emphasize that persons may be punished only if they have voluntarily
done something wrong, and that the punishment “must match, or be
equivalent to the wickedness of the offense.”81  As discussed above,
many commentators are concerned that governments are under-punishing
corporate crime by administering—in the eyes of the commentators—
73 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
74 See id.
75 See id.
76 See id.
77 See Press Release, Press Release, Dep’t. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, supra note
30. R
78 See id.
79 See id.
80 See id.
81 Hugo Adam Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. PHILOSOPHY 601,
602 (1978).
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sanctions that are disproportionately lenient compared to the “wicked-
ness” of the offense.82  Pre-trial settlement agreements, by allowing cor-
porations to evade admitting to any wrongdoing in exchange for
monetary fines, exacerbate this problem.  In contrast, as illustrated in by
the Schiavone case, NPAs and DPAs, while not a complete solution, are
at least a step in the right direction because they allow prosecutors to
require the accused to acknowledge their wrongdoing.83  The acknowl-
edgement, although not as harshly as a criminal record, indicates to the
public that the guilty corporate actor engaged in misconduct and is ac-
cepting responsibility for that misconduct, thus making the punishment
appear more proportional to the crime committed than it would be with-
out such acknowledgement.
Furthermore, DPAs and NPAs require defendants to undertake re-
formatory and remedial measures as nonmonetary remedies for the dam-
age caused.  This serves the utilitarian purposes of legal punishment.  For
instance, in the DPA between Lend Lease (US) Construction LMB Inc.
and the U.S.A.O. of E.D.N.Y., the defendant was charged with various
crimes related to DBE fraud.84  As part of the DPA, Lend Lease agreed
to pay up to fifty-six million dollars in penalties to the federal govern-
ment, in restitution to victims, and to “institute far-reaching corporate
reforms designed to eliminate future problems and enforce best industry
practices.”85  These actions included establishing an Ethics and Compli-
ance Officer, creating a Minority Business Enterprise Liaison position,
and revising policies to accurately report DBE participation.86  Similarly,
in the NPA between the U.S.A.O. of E.D.N.Y. and Schiavone, the corpo-
ration was required to undertake—and indeed did undertake—various re-
form measures to ensure current and future compliance with DBE
programs, including
(i) Establishing a position for an Ethics and Compliance
Officer at Schiavone; (ii) creating contractor minority
compliance manuals, a code of ethics and business con-
duct, and mandatory compliance courses for its employ-
ees; (iii) removing the Schiavone employees directly
involved with the scheme; and (iv) continuing to assist
82 See U.S. Department of Justice Soft on Corporate Crime, supra note 15. R
83 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
84 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., Construction Giant
Lend Lease (f/k/a Bovis) Charged with Defrauding Clients in Three Separate Schemes—Will
Pay Over $50 Million and Institute Comprehensive Reforms (Apr. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nye/pr/2012/2012apr24.html.
85 See id.
86 See id.
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law enforcement in its ongoing investigation of the
fraud.87
In contrast, settlement agreements often demand only monetary
remedies and do not require reformatory or remedial measures.88  In or-
der to compel delinquent corporations to undertake such measures, the
government must enter into separate agreements in addition to the settle-
ment agreement.89  This was the case in the settlement between Williams
Brothers Construction Company (“Williams Brothers”) and the U.S.A.O.
for the Southern District of Texas.90  The U.S.A.O was investigating
Williams Brothers, a prime contractor for numerous federally funded
highway construction projects in Texas, for numerous DBE frauds, in-
cluding the failure to accurately report DBE involvement in the
projects.91  The two parties decided to settle the case before any formal
judicial proceedings were initiated.92  However, the settlement agreement
only stipulated that the defendant pay the government three million dol-
lars to resolve alleged DBE fraud.  As a result, the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) had to enter into a separate administrative agreement
with Williams Brothers to ensure further compliance with DBE require-
ments.93  Entering into multiple agreements, instead of a single agree-
ment such as a DPA or NPA, likely requires additional time, effort, and
administrative costs and is therefore not as efficient as those two
mechanisms.
B. DPA and NPA Agreements Compared to Criminal Trials
Having established that DPAs and NPAs are superior to other alter-
native resolution mechanisms in corporate crime proceedings such as set-
tlement agreements, the remaining question is whether they fail to
achieve the intended results of a formal criminal proceeding.  This will
be examined under both the retributive theory of punishment, particularly
whether the punishment is proportionate to the crimes committed, and
the utilitarian theory of punishment, particularly whether punishment
sufficiently deters criminal conduct.94
87 Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
88 See, e.g., id.
89 See, e.g. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, supra note 23. R
90 See Press release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Houston-Based Company to Pay United
States $3 Million for Fraud Related to Minority Business Enterprise Program (Dec. 14, 2005),
available at  http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/December/05_civ_655.html.
91 See id.
92 See id.
93 See id.
94 Efficiency is also an issue often considered under utilitarian theories of punishment;
since the issue has already been discussed earlier in this Note, see notes 54-58 and accompany-
ing text, supra, it will not be discussed again here.  Instead I simply reiterate that DPAs and
NPAs are more efficient than full criminal prosecutions.
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Whether punishment accomplishes retributive effects boils down to
whether the punishment is appropriate in relation to the seriousness of
the crime.95  A comparison of DBE fraud resolved through NPAs and
DPAs versus DBE fraud resolved through formal prosecution reveals
that, prison terms aside, there is little difference between the end results
in relation to the seriousness of the fraud committed. For instance, in
U.S. v. Tulio, the defendant was a construction contractor that won a
federally funded construction project to replace storm drain pipes along a
railroad line in Pennsylvania.96  As a condition to winning the contract,
Tulio certified that a certain percentage of the work would be subcon-
tracted to a DBE.97  However, Tulio never used the DBE and submitted
fraudulent business utilization reports, invoices, and proof of payments
to the government to make it appear that he had fulfilled the DBE re-
quirements.98  The amount of funds fraudulently misused was approxi-
mately $67,995.99  Tulio was convicted of DBE fraud by the jury through
one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, and two counts of mail
fraud.100  He was sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment, two years of
supervised release, and ordered to pay $40,300 in fines and fees.101
Nothing in the record indicated any mandatory remedial plans in addition
to the fines regarding Tulio’s construction business.
In comparison, in the Schiavone case, discussed above,102 the
amount of misallocated funds—that is, compensation that was supposed
to be paid to DBEs but was not—aggregated to be approximately twenty
million dollars.103  The NPA ordered Schiavone to repay the government
the full 20 million dollars, plus over 1.5 million dollars in investigation
costs.104  In addition, Schiavone was required to implement extensive re-
medial plans to ensure the company complies with current and future
DBE programs.105  In exchange for their cooperation, the corporation
and its officers averted criminal conviction and imprisonment.106
Looking at Tulio and Schiavone side-by-side, one would be hard-
pressed to say that the punishment in the fully prosecuted case is signifi-
cantly harsher than that agreed to in the NPA.  First, when considered as
a percentage of the misallocated funds, the fine was harsher in the NPA
95 See Bedau, supra note 81, at 602. R
96 See 263 Fed. Appx. 258, 260 (3rd Cir. 2008).
97 See id.
98 See id. at 261.
99 See Sentencing at 1, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-48 (E.D.Pa. 2006).
100 See U.S. v Tulio, 263 Fed. Appx. 258, 261 (3rd Cir. 2008).
101 See Judgment at 2-4, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-50 (E.D.Pa. 2006).
102 See notes 54-57 and accompanying text, supra, for facts of the case.
103 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
104 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id.
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than the prosecuted case.  In Tulio, the judge only required the defendant
to pay the government approximately 60% of the total misallocated
funds.107  In Schiavone, the defendant was required to pay 100% of the
total misallocated funds.108  Furthermore, Schiavone paid for the investi-
gation costs that the government incurred – a cost that was not awarded
in Tulio, and is seldom awarded by a jury in a criminal prosecution.109
With regard to the prison term and supervised release in Tulio ver-
sus the mandatory remedial plan in Schiavone, opinions may differ on
which is a more appropriate punishment in DBE fraud and similar corpo-
rate crimes.  In light of the characteristics of DBE, however, remedial
plans better serve the public.  By forcing guilty corporations and corpo-
rate actors to correct their behavior and ensure current and future compli-
ance with DBE programs, the government can further achieve the
purpose of the program and assist traditionally disadvantaged social
groups in the participation of government-sponsored programs.  A prison
term without any follow-up plan may not be as effective in achieving this
purpose.  Furthermore, considering that the misallocation of funds in
both cases did not result in any actual loss or damage—the contracted
work was still completed, although by non-DBE personnel—the depriva-
tion of freedom seems to be an overly harsh penalty.
Of course there may be cases, even of DBE fraud, in which conse-
quences are severe and therefore a prison term may be appropriate.  In
those rare cases, it may be more appropriate to resort to formal trials then
a DPA or NPA.  Such was the situation in U.S. v. Nagle.110  In what the
U.S.A.O. for the Middle District of Pennsylvania described as the “larg-
est DBE fraud in nation’s history,” Nagle was convicted of 26 counts of
various crimes, including conspiracy to defraud, wire fraud, mail fraud,
and money laundering.111  According to DOT, the scheme lasted over
fifteen years, and involved over $136 million in government contracts.112
Although sentencing has not yet occurred, Nagle faces fines of up to
$250,000 on each of the convictions, and up to twenty years of imprison-
ment.113  As Nagle attests, NPAs and DPAs may not be appropriate for
all kinds of corporate crimes.  Corporate crimes involving irreparable
damages, for example, may be better resolved in the courtroom.
107 See Judgment at 2-4, U.S. v. Tulio, 06-cr-00133-50.
108 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
109 See id.
110 441 Fed. Appx. 963 (2011).
111 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Mid Dist. of P.A., Former President
and Owner of Schuylkill Products Convicted in Largest Disadvantaged Business Enterprise
Fraud in Nation’s History (Apr. 6, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/pam/news/
2012/Nagle_04_06_2012.htm.
112 See id.
113 See id.
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However, not all cases of DBE fraud, and certainly not all corporate
crimes, are as severe as those in Nagle.  Many, like Tulio, involve dam-
ages that are under a million dollars.  In such cases, a NPA or DPA
seems to deliver the appropriate level of punishment.114  Even in larger
cases (but not as severe as Nagle), in which millions of dollars of misal-
located funds are involved, as Schiavone exemplifies, NPAs can effec-
tively deliver appropriate punishment to a misbehaving corporation.
Therefore, from a retributive point of view, NPAs and DPAs deliver the
appropriate punishment to offenders in cases of DBE fraud and other
similar corporate crimes.
To compare DPAs and NPAs with full criminal prosecutions under
the utilitarian theory of punishment, specifically the effect of these reso-
lution mechanisms in deterring future crime, a distinction between gen-
eral deterrence and specific deterrence must be drawn. General
deterrence refers to “deterrence concerned with trying to persuade others
who might be inclined to offend not to do so,” while specific deterrence
refers to “attempts to persuade the individual before the court not to com-
mit further offense.”115  Comparing Schiavone and Tulio, it appears that
DPAs and NPAs are as effective as fully prosecuted cases with regard to
DBE fraud and similar corporate crimes.  DPAs and NPAs achieve spe-
cific deterrence in three ways.  First, the often-hefty fine is a significant
deterrent for defendants who are businesses or business people trying to
make a profit in their operations.116  Second, comprehensive remedial
plans involving government supervision are often, if not always, part of
DPAs and NPAs for cases of DBE fraud, thus reducing the opportunity
and incentive for punished corporations or individuals to commit future
frauds.117  Third, if delinquent corporations breach the DPA or NPA,
they are subject to full prosecution.118  Should such a case proceed to
trial, the government, “armed with the company’s admission and all the
evidence obtained from its corporation [from the DPA or NPA], mak[es]
conviction virtually a foregone conclusion.”119  Thus, in terms of specific
deterrence, corporations or individuals under a DPA or NPA have nu-
merous reasons not to reoffend, perhaps even more incentive than upon
completion of a prison term.
In terms of general deterrence, DPAs and NPAs, through their hefty
fines, likely achieve similar results as full prosecutions, even when the
latter adds the risk of a prison term.  As illustrated above in the compari-
114 It is also more efficient from a utilitarian point of view; see notes 54-58 and accompa-
nying text, supra.
115 T.W. Ferris, Sentencing: Practical Approaches 367 (2005).
116 See Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11. R
117 See id.
118 See Wray & Hur, supra note 12 at 1104-06. R
119 Id. at 1105.
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son between Tulio and Schiavone, the NPA required the delinquent cor-
poration to pay a fine equivalent to 100% of the misallocated funds,
while the judge in the litigated case required a fine of only 60%.120
Though difficult to quantify, the significant increase in fine percentage
may lead to similar deterrence results than threatened prison terms, espe-
cially for corporate entities, which cannot be detained because they are
not natural persons.  Furthermore, NPAs and DPAs are regularly pub-
lished in the form of press releases by the responsible United States At-
torney’s Office, similar to cases which are fully litigated.121  These
publications bring a degree of public shame to the delinquent corpora-
tions, which may dissuade the punished corporation from reoffending, as
well as competitor corporations from offending.122  Therefore, NPAs and
DPAs likely achieve the same general deterrence as fully litigated cases.
CONCLUSION
In the appropriate circumstances and for appropriate corporate
crimes, DPAs and NPAs can effectively preserve the financial viability
and integrity of a corporation, while still enabling the government to
punish it for its misconduct and achieve various goals.  The hefty fines
associated with DPAs and NPAs levy appropriate punishments and offer
sufficient retributive value.  What DPAs and NPAs lack in prison terms
may be compensated by the relatively heavier fines charged as seen in
the Schaivone and Tulio comparison.  The mandatory remedial measures
required by DPAs and NPAs and the threat of full prosecution upon
breach deter corporations from committing such crimes in the future.  In
the case of DBEs, the misused funds of the government are repaid, while
delinquent corporations—and the employees that depend on them for a
living—get a second chance under government supervision.  Compared
to other alternative resolution mechanisms like settlements, NPAs and
DPAs offer more retributive value in requiring corporations to acknowl-
edge wrongdoings.  Compared to fully prosecuted trials, DPAs and
NPAs are more efficient, achieving similar resolutions in a shorter time
span.  Furthermore, compared to both settlements and trials, DPAs and
NPAs may achieve greater good for the public and they require
120 See notes 107-08 and accompanying text, supra.
121 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the E. Dist. of N.Y., supra note 11; R
compare Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office for the W. Dist. of N.Y., Buffalo Man Sen-
tenced for Defrauding Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program (Sept. 8, 2011), available
at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nyw/press/press_releases/Rayford.pdf.
122 I merely assert that some form of public shaming will have general and specific deter-
rence effects.  Whether these press releases achieve the same degree of public shaming—and
consequently same amount of deterrence—as media scrutiny in high profile criminal trials is a
topic for another day.
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mandatory remedial measures from misbehaving corporations.  As such,
DPAs and NPAs are effective tools to combat certain kinds of corporate
crimes and should continue to be utilized in the future.
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